Four years into the Ukraine war, Moscow sees vindication, not failure

 Moscow is increasingly viewing what many in the West saw as a strategic error as an expensive but ultimately profitable gamble.

Russian political elites are still certain that their leader, Vladimir Putin, did not make a major mistake by initiating the full-scale conflict in Ukraine in February 2022, even as it approaches its fifth year. Rather, they are reflecting with a sense of accomplishment, and they have excellent cause to think that the conflict is coming to an end on their terms—possibly very soon.

The disparity between Russia's actual expectations of it and how the Western media and expert community interpret them is a startling aspect of this war. The latter frequently characterize Russia's intentions as an expression of its purportedly innate imperialism and desire to regain control of half of Europe, as it did during the Soviet era. 

The real Russian intentions are far more pragmatic and ad hoc. Generally speaking, these boil down to painting a very definite red line against NATO's advance towards Russia's borders, which was obviously intended to isolate and control Russia rather than envision Russia's ultimate integration.

The more aggressive and security-focused parts of Putin's government have always profited from the West's overt animosity toward Russia, which is a different but important reason. These security elites and conservative Western lobbyists who support the military-industrial complex have a close working relationship that benefits both sides financially and politically. Securocratic elites in Russia were able to crush the pro-Western liberal opposition that posed a danger to their political hegemony through the full-scale conflict in Ukraine, which the majority of Russians perceive as a proxy war with NATO.

The events of 2019–2021, however, when newly elected Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy sought rapprochement with Russia—a strategy that led to a near ceasefire along the front line in the Donbas region, where a low-intensity conflict had simmered since 2014—also provided more ad hoc logic for Putin’s decision.

Under intense pressure from Ukraine's own security establishment, Zelenskyy even asserted that he was threatened with a coup due to what was characterized as "capitulation." In the meantime, hawkish lobbyists in the West continued to convince him that a military defeat of Russia was possible, particularly in the wake of Azerbaijan's triumph over Armenia in the last months of 2020.

Zelenskyy abruptly changed his stance on Russia in January 2021, going from being a dove to a hawk who wants to cross all of Putin's red lines. He did this by cracking down on his important Ukrainian allies, launching a vigorous campaign to get Ukraine to join NATO, and opposing the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project. This change took place at the same time that President Joe Biden took office.

Although Putin began stationing soldiers along the Ukrainian border in March 2021, it took him a another 11 months of hesitating before launching the full-scale assault. Meanwhile, Ukraine's Western allies were far more interested in confronting Russia and calling its alleged bluff than in stopping the disaster.

It soon became clear that Putin's plan was similar to Russia's 2008 conflict in Georgia, which was brought on by President Mikheil Saakashvili's disastrous attempt to retake the breakaway territory of South Ossetia. The goal of the shock-and-awe operation was to force Ukraine to adopt a less savory version of the 2015 Minsk agreements, which have not been put into effect since, and to pose a real existential threat to the Ukrainian leadership in Kyiv.

A lengthy conflict along the heavily defended ancient line of contact in the eastern Donbas region was hoped to be avoided. Perhaps because of erroneous assumptions about the strength of Ukrainian resiliency and the urgency of widespread Western military assistance, the plan failed. However, the Russians undoubtedly believe that it was worthwhile to try. By creating a land corridor between Russia and Crimea, which was taken in 2014, they accomplished more than they could have imagined while posing a threat to Kyiv.

The Russians decided to reorganize, leaving behind weakly controlled and challenging-to-hold areas, and started a protracted war of attrition along the Donbas front line after the Istanbul talks were ruined—allegedly due to Anglo-American meddling, according to a variety of international sources. By formally annexing four partially occupied Ukrainian territories, they also increased the price of what they perceive to be Ukrainian intransigence.